DEMONSTRATION DOCUMENT
NORTHSTAR LOGISTICSGLOBAL OPERATIONS
CONFIDENTIAL
EXTERNAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT

Attack surface
assessment Executive & technical report

An evidence-led review of Northstar Logistics’ public-facing applications, identity perimeter and supporting services.

PREPARED FORNorthstar Logistics
ENGAGEMENTNSL-EXT-2026-07
REPORT DATE16 July 2026
NORTHSTAR LOGISTICSSECURITY ASSESSMENT
NSL-EXT-2026-07 · VERSION 1.0

Document control

About this report

ClientNorthstar Logistics
Assessment typeExternal attack surface
Testing window01–12 July 2026
Report statusFinal
ClassificationConfidential
Prepared byAegis Security Consulting
01Executive summary03
02Scope & methodology04
03Findings overview05
04Detailed finding06
05Remediation roadmap07
Confidentiality notice

This document contains sensitive security information intended solely for Northstar Logistics. Distribution should be limited to personnel responsible for risk ownership, remediation and governance. All organizations and systems shown in this demonstration report are fictional.

NORTHSTAR LOGISTICSSECURITY ASSESSMENT
EXECUTIVE VIEW

01 · Executive summary

Material exposure,
clear remediation path.

The assessment identified nine findings across Northstar’s public application and identity perimeter. No evidence of active compromise was observed. Two high-severity weaknesses increase the likelihood of unauthorized administrative access and should be addressed before the next release window.

OVERALL RISK POSTURE
B−
HighRisk score · 7.6 / 10

Risk is concentrated in access-control and session-management weaknesses. The environment otherwise demonstrates good asset ownership and a responsive remediation process.

0Critical
2High
3Medium
4Low / Info

01 What matters now

  • Restrict the public administration console to approved networks.
  • Enforce secure attributes on authentication cookies.
  • Introduce rate limiting on authentication and reset endpoints.

02 Positive observations

  • No critical vulnerabilities or confirmed compromise.
  • Public asset ownership was documented and consistent.
  • Security owners validated high-severity evidence within one day.
NORTHSTAR LOGISTICSSECURITY ASSESSMENT
SCOPE & METHODOLOGY

02 · Engagement definition

Scope and approach

In scope

  • Internet-facing web applications and APIs
  • Authentication and password-reset journeys
  • Public DNS, TLS and email-security posture
  • Non-destructive validation of confirmed findings

Rules of engagement

  • Testing limited to agreed UTC windows
  • No denial-of-service or destructive payloads
  • No access to customer shipment or payment records
  • High-severity issues escalated immediately
01portal.northstar-demo.exampleCustomer portal
02api.northstar-demo.examplePublic API
03sso.northstar-demo.exampleIdentity gateway
04status.northstar-demo.exampleStatus service
01

Discover

Passive and active mapping of assets, services and technologies.

02

Analyze

Manual testing of authentication, access control and application logic.

03

Validate

Controlled reproduction with minimal-impact evidence collection.

04

Report

Risk contextualization, owner review and prioritized remediation.

Rating methodology

Technical severity considers exploitability and impact. Final priority also accounts for asset exposure, data sensitivity, compensating controls and operational context.

NORTHSTAR LOGISTICSSECURITY ASSESSMENT
FINDINGS REGISTER

03 · Findings overview

Nine findings,
prioritized for action.

IDFINDINGASSETSEVERITYSTATUS
NS-01Public administration consoleportalHighOpen
NS-02Weak authentication cookie policyssoHighOpen
NS-03Legacy TLS configurationapiMediumPlanned
NS-04Verbose API error responsesapiMediumOpen
NS-05Missing authentication rate limitssoMediumAccepted
NS-06Permissive SPF policyemailLowPlanned
NS-07Missing frame protectionportalLowOpen
NS-08Unused DNS recordstatusLowConfirmed
NS-09Server version disclosureapiInfoOpen
Prioritization note

Severity is not the remediation order by itself. NS-01 and NS-02 should be treated first because both affect privileged access paths exposed to the internet.

NORTHSTAR LOGISTICSSECURITY ASSESSMENT
FINDING · NS-01

Access control

Public administration console

High
RISK SCORE8.2 / 10
ASSETportal…/admin
LIKELIHOODHigh
STATUSOpen

Observation

The administration console is reachable from the public internet and presents a privileged authentication surface without an additional network-level restriction. While authentication is required, exposure increases opportunities for credential attacks and exploitation of future platform vulnerabilities.

Business impact

Unauthorized access could enable changes to shipment-routing rules, integration credentials and operational user accounts. The likely outcome is disruption to customer operations and loss of integrity in downstream logistics workflows.

Validation

The endpoint was accessed from two unrelated external networks. Response behavior and page assets confirmed the interface as an active administration component.

EVIDENCE 01REDACTED
GET /admin HTTP/2
Host: portal.northstar-demo.example

HTTP/2 200 OK
content-type: text/html
x-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN

<title>Operations Admin</title>

Recommended action

  1. Restrict the console to the corporate VPN or an identity-aware proxy.
  2. Require phishing-resistant MFA for every privileged account.
  3. Alert on repeated failures and log all administrative actions.
NORTHSTAR LOGISTICSSECURITY ASSESSMENT
REMEDIATION ROADMAP

05 · Action plan

Reduce exposure
in three focused waves.

The proposed sequence addresses the most credible access paths first, then strengthens platform resilience and closes lower-risk hygiene items.

0–7DAYS
Contain privileged exposure

Restrict the administration console, enforce privileged MFA and deploy the corrected cookie policy.

PRIMARY OWNERPlatform & IAM
30DAYS
Harden authentication and APIs

Add rate limits, normalize API errors, remove legacy TLS support and verify centralized alerting.

PRIMARY OWNERApplication Security
60–90DAYS
Close hygiene findings

Strengthen email policy, remove unused DNS, add browser security headers and suppress version disclosure.

PRIMARY OWNERInfrastructure

Retest recommendation

Perform a focused validation after the first remediation wave. Evidence for NS-01 and NS-02 should be re-collected from an external network and retained with the change record.

Target posture

Completion of the first two waves is expected to reduce residual assessment risk from High to Low–Moderate.